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Torts
by Phillip Comer Griffeth*
and Cash V. Morris**
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2011 and May 31, 2012.' Unlike previous years, this Article
will not review apportionment of fault under section 51-12-33 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) as this issue has garnered
such significance so as to require a dedicated article in this edition of the
Mercer Law Review.2
I. NEGLIGENCE
All lawyers know that "[i]n order to have a viable negligence action,
a plaintiff must satisfy the elements of the tort, namely, the existence
of a duty on the part of the defendant, a breach of that duty, causation
* Solo Practitioner, Phillip Comer Griffeth, LLC, Athens, Georgia. Davidson College
(B.A., 1989); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1991-1993); Georgia Survey Editor (1992-1993). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Mayer & Harper, LLP, Athens, Georgia. Georgia Institute of
Technology (B.S., with honors, 2003); Georgia State University of Law (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia tort law during the prior survey period, see Phillip Comer
Griffeth & Cash V. Morris, Torts, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 63 MERCER L. REV. 343
(2011).
2. See Thomas A. Eaton, Who Owes How Much? Developments in Apportionment and
Joint and Several Liability Under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 64
MERCER L. REv. 15 (2012). Even pattern jury instructions and verdict forms are subject
to the long reach of apportionment. See Clark v. Rush, 312 Ga. App. 333, 337, 718 S.E.2d
555, 559 (2011) (holding reversible error includes pattern jury instruction charge on
comparative negligence and providing a general verdict form with no space to apportion
fault). In a recent jury trial by one author, where the jury deliberated for seven hours and
ultimately returned a verdict finding the plaintiff 49% at fault, the jury at one point in its
deliberations requested the judge to explain the purpose of the special verdict form, the
underlying reasoning behind assigning percentages to the plaintiff and defendant, and the
effect the apportionment would have on the damages. Hyun Lee v. Dong Yu & D&J Meats,
No. 11EV012840, 2012 WL 3673912 (Ga. State Ct. June 27, 2012).
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of the alleged injury, and damages resulting from the alleged breach of
the duty."3 In establishing duties, counsel should be creative and look
to statutes, 4 the common law, 5 and industry standards and practices6
to provide a basis for a client's recovery.7
But, "[nlo matter how negligent a party may be, if his act stands in no
causal relation to the injury, it is not actionable."' As demonstrated by
Wolfe v. Carter,9 in all but the clearest cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proof and must use the compulsory discovery period to obtain and
introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion
that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a
cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not
enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or
conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes
the duty of the court to grant summary judgment for the defendant. °
In Wolfe, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary
judgment to the defendant on plaintiff's claims that smoke, reducing
visibility on a highway that contributed to a three-car accident, was the
result of a prescribed forest burn by the defendant the day before, onehalf mile away." Although the plaintiff's search located the only
person with a sanctioned burn and showed smoke came from the side of
the highway where the burn had occurred, the court rejected this circumstantial evidence as speculative because the plaintiff did not show the
location of the burn with respect to the highway; whether the fire was

3. Jenkins v. Wachovia Bank, NA, 314 Ga. App. 257, 258, 724 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2012)
(quoting Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, 289 Ga. 565, 566, 713 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2011)).

4. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 specifically provides plaintiffs with a right to recover damages
from the breach of a duty established by statute, even when it does not provide a private
cause of action. O.C.GA. § 51-1-6 (2000).
5. E.g., Rasnick, 289 Ga. at 566-67, 713 S.E.2d at 837.
6. See, e.g., Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 351.
7. See also Jenkins, 314 Ga. App. at 258-59, 724 S.E.2d at 3 (agreeing that plaintiff
is able to maintain a negligence action against bank for breach of duty established under
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1341 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C.)).
8. Whitlock v. Moore, 312 Ga. App. 777, 782, 720 S.E.2d 194, 200 (2011), cert. denied
(quoting Purvis v. Steve, 284 Ga. App. 116, 119, 643 S.E.2d 380, 383 (2007)) (assuming for
argument that even if defendants' pursuit of stolen vehicle was a breach of a duty, no
evidence existed that the pursuit caused thief to wreck and injure plaintiff).
9. 314 Ga. App. 854, 726 S.E.2d 122 (2012).
10. Id. at 856-57, 726 S.E.2d at 125 (quoting Grinold v. Farist, 284 Ga. App. 120,
121-22, 643 S.E.2d 253, 254 (2007)).
11. Id. at 856, 726 S.E.2d at 125.
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extinguished, burning, or capable of producing the complained-of smoke;
weather conditions; or exclusion of all other sources.12
II.

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Jones v. Fayette Family Dental Care, Inc." is a continued reminder
that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, no matter how
egregious the underlying conduct, require severe emotional distress to
be extreme in order to be actionable. In Jones, the plaintiff, a former
dental assistant (Jones) of the defendant dentist (Verdin), brought suit
after she allegedly saw Verdin openly masturbating in a public hallway
during work hours.14 Affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the emotional distress,
not extreme without report of physical ailments
though unpleasant, was
15
or medical treatment.

Emotional distress includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions
such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment,
anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it
is extreme that liability arises. The law intervenes only where the
distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it.1"

With the increasing ubiquity of information technology, it is no
surprise that our appellate courts are providing guidance in the

application of age-old torts to new questions of privacy, trespass, and
speech.' 7

12.

In Sitton v. Print Direction, Inc.," the court of appeals

Id. at 857, 726 S.E.2d at 125. For further discussion of proximate cause, see

Whiteside v. Decker, Hallman, Barber &Briggs, P.C., 310 Ga. App. 16, 19-20, 712 S.E.2d
87, 90-91 (2011) (stating that expert speculation that attorney's failure to inform client of
potential bad faith claim against insurer was the proximate cause of excess judgment).
13. 312 Ga. App. 230, 718 S.E.2d 88 (2011).
14. Id. at 230-31, 718 S.E.2d at 89.
15. Id. at 233-34, 718 S.E.2d at 91.
16. Id. at 233, 718 S.E.2d at 91. See also Ghodrati v. Stearnes, 314 Ga. App. 321, 32324, 723 S.E.2d 721, 723 (2012); Southland Propane, Inc. v. McWhorter, 312 Ga. App. 812,
820, 720 S.E.2d 270, 277 (2011) ("[Alt no point during the lengthy trial did McWhorter
testify about any physical, mental, or emotional symptoms he suffered that were related
to his distress. Nor did he provide any evidence that defendants' conduct caused him to
take medication or seek medical or psychological help."); Williams v. Cobb Cnty. Farm
Bureau, Inc., 312 Ga. App. 350, 352, 718 S.E.2d 540, 543 (2011).
17. See, e.g., Barna Log Homes of Ga., Inc. v. Wischmann, 310 Ga. App. 844, 846, 714
S.E.2d 402, 404-05 (2011) (determining that the customer's e-mail and web postings were
not libelous). Although not examined in this Article, the Georgia Court of Appeals
examined a number of interesting defamation cases during the survey period. See Wertz
v. Allen, 313 Ga. App. 202, 206, 721 S.E.2d 122, 126 (2011) (stating allegedly defamatory
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heard a plaintiff's (Sitton) appeal from a bench trial awarding damages
on Sitton's previous employer's (PDI) counterclaims for breach of duty
of loyalty for Sitton's work with a competing commercial printing
business while an employee at PDL9 After the president of PDI
(Stanton) learned Sitton was engaged in "outside" work, he entered
Sitton's office and moved the mouse on Sitton's personal computer,
attached to PDI's network and used for PDI work; in so doing, he
discovered e-mails associated with a non-PDI e-mail address that
contained evidence Sitton was working for a competitor. After his
discharge, Sitton filed suit for invasions of privacy, computer theft, and
trespass in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-9320 and common law invasion
of privacy."
Focusing on O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93, the court held that Stanton's actions
did not implicate the statute because Stanton did not "take, obtain, or
convert Sitton's property (computer theft); delete any computer program
or data, obstruct or interfere with a computer program or data, or alter
or damage a computer, computer network, or computer program
(computer trespass); or examine Sitton's personal data (computer
invasion of privacy)."22 Although Stanton viewed Sitton's personal
data, the court provided no explanation why this did not trigger the
statute. Regardless, the court concluded that each subsection of the
statute required the proscribed activities be taken "With knowledge" and
"without authority."'
This was not the case here because PDI's
employee manual computer usage policy allowed Stanton to inspect nonPDI equipment on which PDI e-mail was stored to respond to a legal
inquiry or to investigate "indications of unacceptable behavior."24

statements made by college student's mentor were conditionally privileged communications

in investigation by college into student's conduct); Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Pardue, 310 Ga.
App. 355, 358, 713 S.E.2d 456,460-61(2011) (reversing grant of motion to dismiss natural
gas marketer's suit against firm for alleged defamatory press statement released in

conjunction with class action against marketer for deceiving and misleading customers).
See also Boston v. Athearn, No. 12-1-3422-18 (Sup. Ct. Cobb Cnty. filed Apr. 3, 2012), in

which a middle school student filed a defamation suit against two classmates and their
parents seeking punitive damages, alleging they created a fake Facebook page using her
name with a distorted photograph to make her look heavier and stating false claims of
sexual activity, drug use, and racial bias.
18. 312 Ga. App. 365, 718 S.E.2d 532 (2011).

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 366, 718 S.E.2d at 534-35.
O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93 (2011).
Sitton, 312 Ga. App. at 365-66, 718 S.E.2d at 534.
Id. at 368, 718 S.E.2d at 536.

23. Id.; see also O.C.GA § 16-9-93(c).

24. Sitton, 312 Ga. App. at 368-69, 718 S.E.2d at 536 (quoting company's computer
usage policy).
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Turning to Sitton's claim for common law invasion of privacy based
upon an "intrusion upon [his] seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs,""5 the court stated that the rule required an "'unreasonable
intrusion'... involv[ing] a prying or intrusion, which would be offensive
or objectionable to a reasonable person, into a person's private concerns"26 requiring "a physical intrusion which is analogous to a
trespass[.]" 2 7 Clearly, the physicality requirement was not met here,
but could be found in a case where "the defendant conducted surveillance
on the plaintiff or otherwise monitored [plaintiff's] activities. " '
Returning to the employee manual, the court ruled Stanton's investigation, even if considered surveillance, was "reasonable" under the
circumstances and in light of the business interests at stake.2 9
III.
A.

PREMISES LIABiLITY

Trip & Fall Cases

Knowledge-actual versus constructive-on the part of the tortfeasor
continues to be fact-specific. In Landrum v. Enmark Stations, Inc.,3°
the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for the defendants because material issues of fact remained-whether the owner had
constructive knowledge of an uneven crack in the paved surface of its
service station parking lot." For an owner to prevail on summary
judgment based on the lack of constructive knowledge, the owner must
"demonstrate not only that it had a reasonable inspection program in
place, but that such program was actually carried out at the time of the
incident."3 2 Because the owner failed to sufficiently establish procedures
entitled to summary
in place to inspect the parking lot, it was not

25. Id. at 369, 718 S.E.2d at 537 (alteration in original) (quoting Cabaniss v. Hipsley,
114 Ga. App. 367, 370, 151 S.E.2d 496, 500 (1966) (listing four types of invasion of privacy,
one of which is intrusion)).
26. Id. (quoting Yarbray v. S. Bell Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 705, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837
(1991)).
27. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Mergenhagen, 283 Ga. App. 546, 550,642 S.E.2d 105, 109
(2007)).
28. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 283 Ga. App. at 550, 642 S.E.2d at
109).
29. Id. at 369-70, 718 S.E.2d at 537 (quotingAnderson, 283 Ga. App. at 551, 642 S.E.2d
at 110).
30. 310 Ga. App. 161, 712 S.E.2d 585 (2011).
31. Id. at 161, 712 S.E.2d at 586.
32. Id. at 163, 712 S.E.2d at 588 (quoting Shepard v. Winn Dixie Stores, 241 Ga. App.
746, 748, 527 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1999)).
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judgment.3" Likewise, in Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Atkins,34 the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment for
the owner, holding first that a federal food inspector who slipped and fell
on a piece of viscera at the owner's chicken processing plant was an
invitee,35 and, second, that the owner failed to "introduce any evidence
to show adherence to [its] inspection and cleaning procedure on the day
of [the] fall."36 Thus, there was sufficient evidence to survive summary
judgment on the issue of constructive knowledge."
In Williams v. GK Mahavir, Inc.,38 the court reversed summary
judgment for the defendant-hotel on the issue of whether the owner
lacked a reasonable inspection procedure. 39 Because employees cleaned
the lobby area only if needed, there was no time frame in which an
employee was required to walk through-thus no schedule within which
the lobby area was inspected-and no particular time that an employee
inspected or cleaned the lobby area on the day in question; therefore, the
evidence presented a jury question.4 ° Similarly, in Bradley v. WinnDixie Stores, Inc.," the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to the owner, holding that the trial court
erroneously applied the rule of Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol,

33. CompareLandrum, 310 Ga. App. at 163,712 S.E.2d at 588, with Sipple v. Newman,
313 Ga. App. 688, 690-91, 722 S.E.2d 348, 350-51 (2012) (reversing denial of summary
judgment on interlocutory appeal when no evidence existed showing defendant had
superior knowledge of the condition that caused injuries to plaintiff when the awning from
the house gave way). Interestingly, the court in Sipple cites LandingsAss'n v. Williams,
309 Ga. App. 321, 325, 711 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2011), discussed in last year's survey. Sipple,
313 Ga. App. at 690, 722 S.E.2d at 350. See also Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 349
n.51.
34. 310 Ga. App. 423, 713 S.E.2d 483 (2011).
35. Id. at 424, 713 S.E.2d at 486-87. For a discussion of invitee versus licensee, see
infra notes 67-75.
36. SandersonFarms, 310 Ga. App. at 427, 713 S.E.2d at 488.
37. Id. at 426, 713 S.E.2d at 487.
38. 314 Ga. App. 758, 726 S.E.2d 71 (2012).
39. Id. at 762, 726 S.E.2d at 75.
40. Id. at 761-62, 726 S.E.2d at 75. Interestingly, Judge McFadden concurred fully and
specially while Judge Andrews concurred "dubitante." Id. at 762, 726 S.E.2d at 76. See
Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 350 n.60. Judge Andrews now joins Judges Blackwell
and Dillard in questioning Straughterv. J.H. Harvey Co., 232 Ga. App. 29, 500 S.E.2d 353
(1998), in light of Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991); although,
Judge Blackwell has been elevated to the Georgia Supreme Court by appointment of
Governor Nathan Deal on June 25, 2012.
41. 314 Ga. App. 556, 724 S.E.2d 855 (2012). Judge Blackwell writes the opinion for
the panel also including Judges Barnes and Adams. See text accompanying supra note 40
regarding Judge Blackwelrs appointment to the Georgia Supreme Court.
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Inc.,42 and when "no contradiction appear[ed] in the deposition testimony offered by [the plaintiff]," her testimony was sufficient proof of
constructive knowledge to overcome a summary judgment.'
However, plaintiffs must still carry their burden of proof to show
negligence. In Willingham Loan & Realty Co. v. Washington,44 the trial
court's denial of summary judgment to the apartment complex owners
was reversed when the plaintiff deposed that she "[did not] know what
caused [her] to fall" and "adduced no other evidence from which a jury
could infer that the owners' alleged negligence in failing to maintain the
stairs caused her to fall."' 5 A "mere possibility" that a defect in the
stairs caused the fall was insufficient.4 Similarly, in Paggett v. Kroger
Co. ,4 summary judgment for a gas station was affirmed when the
plaintiff showed no evidence of a dangerous condition. 4' Further, the
plaintiff was not entitled to a spoliation presumption based on the
defendant's inability to produce a surveillance video of the station on the
day of the fall (merely completing an incident report not necessarily
enough).4 9 "[Piroof of a fall, without more, does not give rise to liability
,,50

42. 256 Ga. 27, 343 S.E.2d 680 (1986).
43. Bradley, 314 Ga. App. at 559, 724 S.E.2d at 859. But see Perdue v. Atlanta Bldg.
Maint. Co., 311 Ga. App. 81, 83-84, 714 S.E.2d 611, 613-14 (2012) (affirming summary
judgment for contractor and subcontractor when plaintiff slipped and fell on recently
stripped and waxed school hallway when there was no "express contractual provision that
would cast liability," and the subcontractor had warned plaintiff of the operation).
44. 311 Ga. App. 535, 716 S.E.2d 585 (2011).
45. Id. at 536, 716 S.E.2d at 586-87.
46. Id. at 536, 716 S.E.2d at 587.
47. 311 Ga. App. 690, 716 S.E.2d 792 (2011).
48. Id. at 691-92, 716 S.E.2d at 794-95.
49. Id. at 692-93, 716 S.E.2d at 795. See also Pacheco v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 311 Ga.
App. 224,227, 715 S.E.2d 728,732 (2011) (affirming the defense verdict when no reversible
error was shown in the trial court's exercise of discretion to charge the jury on the
rebuttable presumption arising from spoliation, as opposed to instructing jury that it must
accept as true plaintiffs' description of the assault, related to lost security surveillance
tape). However, for a case that demonstrates the potential liability to a defendant for
violating a spoliation order, see Walters v. The Kroger Co., No. 09-C-14740-S4, 2012 WL
425310, at *1 (Ga. State Ct. 2012) (awarding a jury verdict of $2.3 million to a man hurt
slipping in a Kroger store after the judge concluded the company destroyed a video of the
accident and acted in bad faith). See also Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Spoliation mars
Kroger'sdefense, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP. 1 (Jan. 27, 2012).

50. Paggett, 311 Ga. App. at 690, 716 S.E.2d at 794. See also Watts & Colwell
Builders, Inc. v. Martin, 313 Ga. App. 1, 6, 720 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2011) (reversing summary
judgment on interlocutory appeal under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 because no facts demonstrated
that the owner should have discovered and repaired the hinge on the bathroom stall door
before plaintiffs injury).
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The plaintiff's own knowledge can also bar recovery as a matter of law.
In Bartlett v. McDonough Bedding Co.,51 the appellate court affirmed
summary judgment for the owner of a bedding and antiques shop when
the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, citing the
"voluntary departure" rule. 52 Similarly, in McLemore v. Genuine Parts
Co.," the court also affirmed summary judgment for the owner after
the plaintiff's fall from a parking lot curb, "agree [ing] with the trial court
that [the plaintiff] had equal knowledge of any hazard presented by the
height of the curb" and rejecting the argument that the "distraction
theory" precluded summary judgment.54 Likewise, in another case
citing Robinson v. Kroger5 5 that dealt with the distraction doctrine, the
same panel of the court reversed a denial of summary judgment to the
property owner.5" "[Wihether by distraction or emergency, the doctrine
addresses a plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation (not avoidance) of the
danger, which is the touchstone of premises liability-the 'proprietor
may be liable only if he had superior knowledge of a condition that
exposed an invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm."'5 7
B. Dog Bites
"Superior knowledge" remains the basis for liability under Georgia's
premises liability statute,5" even in the context of a dog bite.59 Thus,
in Stolte v. Hammack," the court of appeals affirmed summary
judgment in favor of a townhouse owner when the plaintiff could not
show the owner-and also the roommate-had superior knowledge of the
dog's 61 temperament. 61

63
the court
Similarly, in Brock v. Harris,

51. 313 Ga. App. 657, 722 S.E.2d 380 (2012).
52. Id. at 658-59, 722 S.E.2d at 382 (citing Gaydos v. Grupe Real Estate Investors, 211
Ga. App. 811, 813, 440 S.E.2d 545, 547-48 (1994); Chamblee v. Grayco, Inc., 266 Ga. App.
154, 156, 596 S.E.2d 683, 685 (2004); Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748, 493 S.E.2d
403, 414 (1997)).

53. 313 Ga. App. 641, 722 S.E.2d 366 (2012) (Judges Ellington, Doyle, and Miller on
the panel).
54. Id. at 644-45, 722 S.E.2d at 369.
55. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
56. Benefield v. Vance, 315 Ga. App. 505, 509, 726 S.E.2d 531, 534 (2012) (Judges
Ellington, Doyle, and Miller on the panel).
57. Id. at 509, 726 S.E.2d at 533 (quoting Dickerson v. Guest Serve. Co., 282 Ga. 771,
772, 653 S.E.2d 699, 700 (2007)). The plaintiff and his band (The Honky Tonk Rangers)
were asked to perform at the owner's annual lakefront Fourth of July party. Id. at 505-06,
726 S.E.2d at 531-32.
58. O.C.G.A. § 51-3--1 (2000).
59. E.g., Stolte v. Hammack, 311 Ga. App. 710, 712, 716 S.E.2d 796, 797-98 (2011).
60. 311 Ga. App. 710, 716 S.E.2d 796 (2011).
61. The owner had a pit bull named Cujo. Id. at 710, 716 S.E.2d at 797.

2012]

TORTS

295

reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to the premisesowner when a customer to a mower repair shop failed to present
evidence that the owner had superior knowledge that his dog had the
propensity to behave aggressively.6 Also, in Cormier v. Willis, 5 the
court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, who was not home
but on vacation, and who neither owned nor kept the dog-a pit bull
named Kain."
Status on Property
Consistent with case law from the last survey period, a plaintiffs
status on the property can sometimes be a jury question. 7 Thus, while
a visitor to a state prison can be an invitee as a matter of law, 8
whether a state prisoner who volunteered to paint the warden's house
and severed his urethra after a fall was considered a licensee or an
invitee was properly a jury question, and the jury's verdict against the
Georgia Department of Corrections was affirmed. 9 Likewise, in
Bethany Group, LLC v. Grobman,70 facts presented at summary
judgment rendered it impossible to determine the plaintiffs status as a
C.

matter of law.71 Questions of fact remained for a jury to determine

whether the plaintiff's husband, shot to death in his taxicab, "was called
to the premises by a resident of the [apartment] complex, thereby having
a business relationship with an occupier of the land, or whether another
individual with no relationship to [the owner] lured him to the corn-

62. Id. at 712, 716 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Wade v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458,
461, 540 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2000)).
63. 312 Ga. App. 493, 718 S.E.2d 851 (2011).
64. Id. at 494-95, 718 S.E.2d at 852.
65. 313 Ga. App. 699, 722 S.E.2d 416 (2012).
66. Id. at 699-701, 722 S.E.2d at 416-18.
67. See Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 347 n.38. A plaintiffs classification of

status can also determine the extent of a premises owner's liability. See Jordan v. Bennett,
312 Ga. App. 838, 841, 720 S.E.2d 301, 302-04 (2011) (reversing the trial court's denial of
summary judgment on interlocutory appeal after the plaintiff, a licensee, consumed five
beers and two "lemon drop" cocktails, went out onto a balcony to smoke and drink another
beer, and fell over the railings of the balcony and onto the sidewalk).
68. Freeman v. Eichholz, 308 Ga. App. 18,22, 705 S.E.2d 919,923 (2011), discussed at
Griffeth & Morris supra note 1, at 347 n.38.
69. Georgia Dep't of Corr. v. Couch, 312 Ga. App. 544, 545-46, 718 S.E.2d 875, 879-80
(2011).
70. 315 Ga. App. 298, 727 S.E.2d 147 (2012) (Judges Ellington, Doyle, and Miller on
the panel).
71. Id. at 299-300, 727 S.E.2d at 149.
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plex."72 But in Sands v. Lindsey, 3 the court concluded that when an
emergency medical technician (EMT) slammed into a glass storm door,
he was a licensee as a matter of law and affirmed summary judgment
for the owner.7 4 The court in Sands conceded that "Georgia's appellate
courts have not directly addressed the status of EMTs, . . ." but,
nonetheless,
likened their status to that of police officers and firefight75
ers.

IV. DERIVATIVE LIABILITY
Gilmore,7" a straight-forward automobile

In O'Harav.
negligence case
against a driver (Caitlin) and her parents (O'Haras) under the family
purpose doctrine, the Georgia Court of Appeals examined the trial court's
denial of the O'Haras' motion for summary judgment-following the
court's dismissal of the claim against Caitlin with prejudice-for the
plaintiff's failure to perfect service. 77 The plaintiff's inability to obtain
a judgment against Caitlin "foreclosed a derivative claim against the
[parents] for vicarious liability under the family purpose doctrine." 8
Agreeing and reversing the trial court in favor of the O'Haras, the court
relied upon vicarious liability principles to hold that if the action solely
stems from the negligence of the servant, and the servant (Caitlin) is
dismissed, the derivative claim cannot be maintained against the master
(O'Haras):

72. Id. A triable issue also remained as to whether the owner's failure to retain
security on the premises or take other precautions was the proximate cause of death. Id.
at 301, 727 S.E.2d at 150. But see Williams v. Capitol Corporate Cleaning, Inc., 313 Ga.
App. 61, 62, 720 S.E.2d 228, 230 (2011). In Williams, the same panel of judges as in
Bethany affirmed a jury's defense verdict (noting that Capitol, as independent contractor,
did not have independent duty as owner/occupier to inspect the premises for the safety of
the employer's invitees and jury charge accurately stated the same). Id. at 61, 65-66, 720
S.E.2d at 229, 232.
73. 314 Ga. App. 160, 723 S.E.2d 471 (2012).
74. Id. at 161, 164, 723 S.E.2d at 472, 474.
75. Id. at 163-64, 723 S.E.2d at 474.
76. 310 Ga. App. 620, 713 S.E.2d 869 (2011). For an interesting discussion and
application of family immunity and its exceptions, see Donegan v. Davis, 310 Ga. App. 446,
448, 714 S.E.2d 49, 51 (2011) (barring suit against a mother for injuries her child suffered
in an automobile accident by parental immunity, despite intoxication at time of collision,
because it was not "a malicious or wilful act of such cruelty").
77. O'Hara, 310 Ga. App. at 620-21, 713 S.E.2d at 869.
78. Id. at 621,713 S.E.2d at 869. The family purpose doctrine provides that "the owner
of an automobile who permits members of his household to drive it for their own pleasure
or convenience is regarded as making such a family purpose his business, so that the driver
is treated as his servant." Id. at 622, 713 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting Medlin v. Church, 157 Ga.
App. 876, 878, 278 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1981)).
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"The same principles apply to a master and servant when sued jointly
in an action based solely on the negligence of the servant... as would
apply in cases of joint liability against joint tortfeasors[. Specifically,]
the verdict and judgment must be valid against both or it is valid
against neither." While the foregoing rule of indivisibility is not
absolute in all cases, it is absolute here where, among other things,
"some of the tortfeasors ... are released therefrom for reasons other
than on the merits, as shown by... evidence.., such as ... lack of
service ... . 9
It is unclear how this statement squares with the law recently quoted
by a different panel of the same court that
one who is damaged as the result of a tort committed by a corporate
agent may sue either the individual agent, seeking to establish the
agent's personal liability for the damages, or the corporation, seeking
to establish its vicarious liability for the torts of its agent, or both.'
On its second trip to the court of appeals, 8 Georgia Messenger
Service, Inc. v. Bradley, 2 on appeal from an employer's denied motion
for summary judgment, provided the court with the opportunity to
examine whether the plaintiff presented facts sufficient to impose
liability on a master for the intentional torts of its employee.'
The
plaintiff alleged that Georgia Messenger Service, Inc.'s (GMS) courier
(Wise) attacked a security guard (Bradley) for placing a boot on Wise's

79. Id. at 622, 713 S.E.2d at 870 (alteration in original) (quoting Medlin, 157 Ga. App.
at 878, 278 S.E.2d at 749-50).
80. Thorpe v. Sterling Equip. Co., 315 Ga. App. 909, 915, 729 S.E.2d 52, 58 (2012)
(quoting Smith v. Hawks, 182 Ga. App. 379, 384, 355 S.E.2d 669, 675 (1987)) (stating the
duty to inspect chattel for safety provided in bailor-bailee relationship is not provided
under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 as adopted in Georgia).
81. In Georgia Messenger Service, Inc. v. Bradley, 302 Ga. App. 247, 690 S.E.2d 888
(2010), the court of appeals remanded the case with direction to the trial court to consider
untimely filed depositions to determine the courier's employment status with a messenger
service. Id. at 247, 690 S.E.2d at 889. For further discussion of derivative liability for
employers and their agents using vehicles, see Wood v. B & S Enterprises,Inc., 314 Ga.
App. 128, 130, 723 S.E.2d 443, 446 (2012) (holding that the trial court did not err in giving
special mission doctrine charge) and Matheson v. Braden, 310 Ga. App. 585, 585, 713
S.E.2d 723, 724 (2011) (holding that, absent other evidence, a servant using a master's
vehicle to drive home for lunch was not acting within the scope of employment at the time
of wreck).
82. 311 Ga. App. 148, 715 S.E.2d 699 (2011). Cf Orton v. Masquerade, Inc., 311 Ga.
App. 656, 716 S.E.2d 764 (2011); McKee Foods Corp. v. Lawrence, 310 Ga. App. 122, 712
S.E.2d 79 (2011), cert. denied.
83. Ga. Messenger, 311 Ga. App. at 151-52, 715 S.E.2d at 703.
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vehicle after he illegally parked to deliver a package."
doctrine of respondeat superior,

[Vol. 64
Under the

"[t]wo elements must be present to render a master liable for his
servant's actions ... : first, the servant must be in furtherance of the
master's business; and, second, he must be acting within the scope of
his master's business." If a tort is committed by an employee for
reasons unrelated to that employment (for example, "for purely
personal reasons disconnected from the authorized business of the
master"), the employer is not liable. Summary judgment for the master,
then, is appropriate when the evidence "shows that the servant was not
engaged in furtherance of his master's business but was on a private
enterprise of his own." Finally, the question of whether "the servant at
the time of an injury to another was acting in the prosecution of his
master's business and in the scope of his employment is for determination by the jury, except in plain and indisputable cases."'
Examining the evidence, the court determined that genuine issues of
material fact existed-specifically, whether Wise's actions were in
furtherance of GMS's business and within the scope of the same because
his illegal parking and confrontation with Bradley was for the purpose
of timely delivery of the package and a result of the intense pressure
placed on him by GMS to deliver more packages than possible in the
time allotted.'
V. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
In O'Brien v. Bruscato,"7 the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed the majority opinion of a divided' court of appeals' decision
discussed in last year's survey.8 9 There, the court reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to a psychiatrist on a patient's
claims surrounding the patient killing his mother during a psychotic
episode while in the doctor's care.90 Victor Bruscato, a severely mentally ill man with a history of violence, sued his psychiatrist, Dr. Derek

84. Id. at 148, 715 S.E.2d at 701.
85. Id. at 151, 715 S.E.2d at 703 (alteration in original) (quoting Drury v. Harris
Ventures, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 545, 546-47, 691 S.E.2d 356, 358 (2010)) (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 152, 715 S.E.2d at 703.
87. 289 Ga. 739, 715 S.E.2d 120 (2011).
88. Division 2 of Judge Andrews's dissent, joined by Judges Doyle and Johnson, would
affirm the trial court's decision and adopt the public policy bar even if the plaintiff did not
possess the requisite mens rea to establish culpability for the illegal act. Bruscato v.
O'Brien, 307 Ga. App. 452, 465, 705 S.E.2d 275, 285-86 (2010) (Andrews, J., dissenting),
affd, 289 Ga. 739, 715 S.E.2d 120 (2011).
89. Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 357-58.
90. Bruscato, 307 Ga. App. at 461-62, 705 S.E.2d at 283.
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O'Brien, for negligent withdrawal and monitoring of his medication that
he alleged caused him to ' decompensate" and brutally kill his mother
while in a psychotic state. 91 Determining that the Georgia Court of
Appeals had "correctly examined" the public policy issues at hand, the
Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed the public policy bar that "when one
knowingly commits a wrongful act, he cannot use this act for personal
gain[,]" but, as in the case subjudice, "[tihere may be situations... when
an individual's psychiatric disorder prevents him from exercising a
reasonable degree of care to prevent himself from taking improper and
illegal actions[,]"92 thereby preventing him from "knowingly" committing the act which would otherwise be a bar to recovery.93 Here, jury
issues existed as to whether the patient had the "requisite mental
capacity to commit murder."94 Summary judgment was inappropriate
on his claim because it was disputed whether he knowingly committed
95
the act that would function as a public policy bar to his recovery.
In Peterson v. Reeves,96 the court of appeals, in a divided opinion,
again affirmed the denial of summary judgment to a psychiatrist on
another medical malpractice claim seeking damages that were, in part,
the result of the patient's own conduct.97 The opinion, concurrence, and
dissents provide a glimpse into the thoughts of our appellate judges in
interpreting statutes and how duties are established.
Since December 2001, plaintiff Mona Reeves had been under
psychiatrist Mark Peterson's care for a number of serious mental
illnesses including psychotic disorders.98 In early August 2005, Reeves
was admitted to an emergency room twice in two days for evincing
psychotic behaviors, the second instance requiring involuntary commitment at Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital for being "at high risk of
committing suicide. ' 9 After a three-day hospital stay, she was
transferred to Horizons Crisis Group Home (Horizons), a voluntary
treatment facility. Following her Horizons discharge, she was again
brought to the emergency room on August 23 and readmitted to
Horizons later that evening. 100 Peterson saw Reeves on August 26,
2005 and "diagnosed her with severe major depressive disorder with

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

O'Brien, 289 Ga. at 742, 715 S.E.2d at 123.
Id.
Id. at 743, 715 S.E.2d at 123.
Id. (quoting Bruscato, 307 Ga. App. at 459, 705 S.E.2d at 282).
Id. at 742, 715 S.E.2d at 123.
315 Ga. App. 370, 727 S.E.2d 171 (2012).
Id. at 370, 727 S.E.2d at 172-73.
Id. at 371, 727 S.E.2d at 173.
Id.
Id. at 371-72, 727 S.E.2d at 173.
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psychosis and bipolar disorder with psychosis, and prescribed medication."'' She was subsequently discharged from Horizons on August
29 without a consult with Peterson. On August 31, she attempted to
commit suicide. Reeves and her conservator filed suit alleging numerous
breaches by Peterson, including his failure to: a) subject Reeves to a
suicide or self-injury risk assessment; b) provide an adequate psychiatric
evaluation and consideration forhospitalization; c) stabilize Reeves in a
or
proper medication regimen; and d) remain available for consultation,
10 2
have another psychiatrist available, when she was discharged.
In affirming the trial court's denial of the psychiatrist's motion for
summary judgment, the court of appeals recognized "that, under some
circumstances, the failure to commit may constitute a breach of the wellestablished duty of care physicians owe patients, and that when a fact
question has been created on that issue, it is for the jury."'10 3 However,
the majority0 4 made clear "that the trial court did not create, and we
are not creating, a new 'duty to commit.""' 5 Although proximate cause
played a role, the fundamental disagreement in the opinion is whether
the plaintiff has presented a breach of any duty imposed on psychiatrists
under the law.
The majority relied primarily on "a psychiatrist's statutory duty to
'bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable degree of care and
skill, "' 106 a breach of which proximately causes injury, established by
10 7
Reexpert testimony, and heard and decided by the fact-finder.
sponding to Judge Andrews's recognition of an exception when a patient
commits suicide outside a hospital and Judge Mikell's position that it is
the court's duty to state there is no duty to commit the patient, Judge
McFadden relied on the general statute and stated: "Appellate judges,
although they have the raw power to create exceptions consistent with
their policy preferences, have neither the competence nor the legitimate
authority to do so, and should therefore exercise self-restraint."'0 8

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 378, 727 S.E.2d at 177.
104. Judge McFadden wrote the majority opinion with a concurrence by Judge Phipps,
a special concurrence by Judge Dillard, and a concurrence in judgment only by Judge
Barnes. Judges Andrews and Mikell-who retired from the court at the end of August
2012-filed separate dissents.
105. Peterson, 315 Ga. App. at 378, 727 S.E.2d at 177.
106. Id. at 370,727 S.E.2d at 172; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-27 (2000); O.C.G.A. § 37-3-4
(2012).
107. Peterson, 315 Ga. App. at 375, 727 S.E.2d at 175.
108. Id. at 377, 727 S.E.2d at 177.
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In his special concurrence, Judge Dillard wrote that while he agreed
with the majority's conclusion, he believed the "majority's opinion could
be misconstrued as creating an affirmative duty for a mental healthcare
" 10 9
professional to involuntarily commit a potentially suicidal patient.
Further, summary judgment was properly denied because there was
ample evidence of multiple breaches in Peterson's care" ° which, given
Reeves's high risk of suicide, could result in the foreseeable harm of her
attempting suicide."'
In both of their dissents, Judges Andrews and Mikell stated that
"[blecause the existence of a legal duty... is a question of law for the
court," not the jury, and when no statute or case law establishes the
duty, there was no legal duty requiring the doctor to prevent a suicide
when the patient was not in the doctor's control." 2
Judge Andrews distinguished Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute,
Inc. n 3 from Ermutlu v. MeCorkle."4 He stated that the plaintiff had
failed to establish a breach of any supposed duty which proximately
caused her injuries, because her experts could not testify whether the
plaintiff was a danger to herself when she was discharged, or whether
hospitalization would have prevented the suicide attempt five days
later."5 Judge Mikell focused his dissent on the distinction between
cause-in-fact and proximate cause16: even assuming a breach, while
this failure would be a cause-in-fact under the "but for" test, it would fail
as too remote a proximate cause-a policy decision-to say it legally
caused the injury when the attempt occurred five days after discharge,

109. Id. at 378, 727 S.E.2d at 177 (Dillard, J., concurring specially).
110. Id. The plaintiff, by way of her experts, provided multiple theories of negligence
on the part of Peterson: a) failure to adequately assess her condition and risk of harm to
herself; b) failure to perform a suicide risk assessment prior to discharge; c) her expressed
guilt for not caring for her deceased mother; d) voices Reeves heard that told her "she
needed to burn in hell"; e) failure to stabilize Reeves with medication; and f) unavailability
for consultation on the date of discharge for evaluation or by providing another physician
for consultation. Id. at 375-76, 379, 727 S.E.2d at 175, 178 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 379, 727 S.E.2d at 177-78 (Dillard, J., concurring specially).
112. Id. at 384, 727 S.E.2d at 179 (Andrews, J., dissenting); id. at 381-82, 727 S.E.2d
at 182 (Mikell, J., dissenting).
113. 188 Ga. App. 106,372 S.E.2d 265(1988), affd, 259 Ga. 376,382 S.E.2d 597(1989).
114. 203 Ga. App. 335, 416 S.E.2d 792 (1992).
115. Peterson, 315 Ga. App. at 385, 727 S.E.2d at 180 (Andrews, J., dissenting). "(1)
[T]he physician must have control over the mental patient; and (2) the physician must have
known or reasonably should have known that the patient was likely to cause bodily harm
to others." Id. at 386, 727 S.E.2d at 181 (quoting Ermutlu, 203 Ga. App. at 336, 416 S.E.2d
at 794).
116. See id. at 382, 727 S.E.2d at 183 (Mikell, J., dissenting).
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when the plaintiff was not in the defendant's control, and when the
defendant did not know the plaintiff had left Horizons. 7
VI. DRAM SHOP
In Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC," 8 the Georgia Supreme Court explored whether the liability provisions of the Georgia
Dram Shop Act (GDSA)" 9 applied to the sale of alcoholic beverages in
closed or prepackaged containers by a convenience store for consumption
off the store premises. 2 ' Answering in the affirmative, the court held
the GDSA's plain language supplied a basis for convenience store
liability:
a person ... who knowingly sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic
beverages to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication,
knowing that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, may
become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the
intoxication of such.., person when the sale, furnishing, or serving is
the proximate cause of such injury or damage.
121
The court reasoned that the statute was applicable, as a convenience
store could: a) "knowingly [sell]" alcoholic beverages to a person who is
in a state of noticeable intoxication, b) knowing that such person will
soon be driving a motor vehicle.'22
In construing the statute and limiting it to cases in which alcoholic
beverages were served or poured on the vendor's premises, the Georgia
Court of Appeals had reasoned that a broader reading, although covered
by the statute, would lead to "wholly impractica[l] results"' 2* requiring
"a jury to speculate about or invent a basis for finding that it was
foreseeable to the seller that the sale created an unreasonable risk that
the buyer could cause harm by driving while intoxicated"

124

because a

convenience store could not know if the purchaser "would drink the beer,

117. Id.
118. 289 Ga. 466, 713 S.E.2d 368 (2011). For a discussion of the court of appeals
opinion, see Kate S. Cook et al., Trial Practiceand Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia,
63 MERCER L. REV. 359, 370-71 (2011).

119. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (2000).
120. Flores,289 Ga. at 466, 713 S.E.2d at 368. The issue was addressed by the court
of appeals in Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia,LLC, 304 Ga. App. 333, 333, 696 S.E.2d
125, 125-26 (2010). See supra note 118.
121. Flores, 289 Ga. at 467, 713 S.E.2d at 369; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b).
122. Flores, 289 Ga. at 468, 713 S.E.2d at 370.
123. Id. at 467, 713 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting Flores, 304 Ga. App. at 336, 696 S.E.2d at
127).
124. Id.

20121

TORTS

303

how much he might drink, when he might do so, or whether he would
drive soon after drinking."" 2
On review, the supreme court held that the court of appeals had
abandoned fundamental principles of statutory construction requiring
courts to "ascertain the purpose and intent [of a statute]... [and] when
a statute is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable
construction, the court has no authority to place a different construction
upon it ...

126

The supreme court dispelled concerns by the court of appeals that this
reading and application would lead to speculation by juries and
"impractica[1] results" by referring to the statute wherein there is no
statutory requirement that the seller know when or how much alcohol
the buyer will consume before he gets behind the wheel.'27
[Bly focusing in this case on the convenience store's knowledge as to
the purchaser's plans to consume the beer, the Court of Appeals missed
the mark. The focus should have been solely on the convenience
[store's] knowledge as to whether its customer was noticeably
intoxicated and would be driving soon. If a convenience store sells
alcohol to such a customer, it is foreseeable that the customer will
drive while intoxicated and injure an innocent third party. And if the
plaintiff can prove that such sale of alcohol was a proximate cause of
any injuries, the convenience store will be held liable.1"
The supreme court stated that a convenience store has an opportunity
to see how a patron arrived, will depart, and, in connection with the
sale, an opportunity to observe if he is noticeably intoxicated. 129 This
opportunity may not be equal to the traditional dram shop, but this is
a jury issue and goes to the facts. 3 ° In addition to statutory construction, although not explicitly stated in the opinion, the underlying current
of the opinion is that the supreme court believes the basis on which the
court of appeals excluded convenience stores from the statute-namely,
the foreseeability of a buyer consuming the supplied alcohol and
subsequently driving creating an unreasonable risk that the buyer could
cause harm-is an issue of causation, which can be determined by the

125.
127).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 469, 713 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting Flores, 304 Ga. App. at 335, 696 S.E.2d at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

470, 713 S.E.2d at 371.
467-68, 713 S.E.2d at 370.
470, 713 S.E.2d at 371 (citations omitted).
469, 713 S.E.2d at 370.
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jury pursuant to the statute, rather than to the exclusion of the statute
and its plain language and the duties it imposes on all vendors.'3 1
VII.

CONCLUSION

If practitioners can glean any practice pointers from a review of this
year's tort cases, it would likely be to go "back to the basics" or, as old
mentors often say, "start with the statute." Georgia's appellate courts
almost always use the statutory language as a starting point in their
analysis. Second, counsel should always remember who has the burden
of proof. A review of this Article will show that in cases with a wellpleaded complaint and cases in which trial counsel have made a good
appellate record showing all relevant facts to support their claims, our
appellate courts will, more likely than not, allow the case to proceed to
trial.
Looking forward to next year's survey period, personnel changes on
both courts will result in fertile ground for analysis, as the new judges
chart their courses and hone their judicial philosophies on the appellate
bench-some for the first time and others, as in the case with Justice
Blackwell, who have already made their mark on Georgia's tort
jurisprudence.

131.

Id. at 470, 713 S.E.2d at 371.

